grown old. Dyphilosophy's grey in grey it cannot be rejuvenated but only understood. I I My theme is found in Marx's eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach: "The philosophers have only interpreted the world in different ways; the point is to change it.'" This dictum might be understood. either as proposing that philosophy be rejected in favour of some discipline capable of more practical application. or as urging that philosophy itself be reformed to constitute such a discipline. It is the second alternative that I assume Marx to have intended in formnlating the Thesis.
Marx contends that philosophy should become of use to man in determining what to do. and in particular. in acting to change the world in which he lives. This. to the devotees of linguistic analysis with whom I normally associate. is a very queer view of philosophy. I shall. therefore. use their own philosophical standpoint to show that Marx may be rightto show. indeed. that his own social theory may be considered as both philosophical and practical. 3 The aim of Marx's theoretical inquiries is summarily stated in the excellent Introduction which T. B. Bottomore and Maximilien Rubel provide to their selection of his writings: "To transform speculative philosophy into a critical social theory which wonld be of use to men overcome by misery." of use to achieve "a society in which men. liberated from the 'alienations' and 'mediations' of capitalist society. would be the masters of their own destiny. through their understanding and control both of Nature and of their own social relationships ... • The attainment of this aim requires two transformations. The first, explicitly stated here, is the transformation of speculative philosophy into social theory; the second, implied in the account of the use of that theory, is the transformation of social theory into revolutionary practice.
If we examine certain objections to this second transformation, to Marx's theory considered as a guide to action, we shall fmd that their resolution leads us into a domain properly labelled "philosophy." Thus the second transformation may be used to show the significance of the first.
II
Marx's social theory not only tells man "overcome by misery" how the capitalist order may be replaced by the socialist order; it assures him that this replacement is inevitable. Marx claims to uncover the laws governing the development of capitalist societies, and to demonstrate, by strict deduction from these laws, that capitalist society will pass through a series of crises, each more severe than its predecessor, until the developing forces of production will smash the bourgeois relations of production which bind them. Thus the appelation "scientific socialism," which Engels confers upon Marx's theory, is hardly an exaggeration. Just as the orthodox political economy of the followers of Smith and Ricardo demonstrated the necessity and permanence of capitalist relations of production, and hence of laissez-faire in the political sphere, so the Marxian social theory demonstrates the necessity of the overthrow of these relationships in favour of socialist ones, and hence the necessity of the emergence of socialist society.
Furthermore, as the supposed necessity of the conditions of production in capitalist society enabled its apologists to counter all demands for action to reform the abuses inherent in that society with the plea that such action could not succeed, so the supposed necessity of the emergence of socialism enables its advocates to urge on the proletariat with the cry that their actions cannot but succeed. But, if success is inevitable, why act at all? The historical process pursues its inexorable course, whatever we poor mortals endeavour. Psychologically, the assurance of inevitable success is a powerful stimulus to action, but logically, the theory is, one might say, too good. It tells us, not that socialism may come, if we act in accordance with the prescriptions it provides, but that socialism must come, whatever we do. Marx seems to adopt a self-contradictory position. In The Holy Family, he insists: "It is not 'history' which uses men as a means of achieving ... its own ends. llistory is nothing but the activity of men in pursuit of their ends.'" But in Capital he writes: "When a society has got upon the right track for the discovery of the natural laws of its movement ... it can neither clear by bold leaps, nor remove by legal enactments, the obstacles offered by the successive phases of its normal development. But it can shorten and lessen the birth-pangs.'" History is, then, both the sphere of human action, based on human ends, and an inevitable process-or, rather, a series of inevitable processesincapable of being affected by man. The future is the product of human action; the future is the predictable extrapolation of the present. The possibility of action thus opposes the possibility of prediction. Is Marx trapped in contradiction? Or do his critics fail to recognize a dialectical opposition-an opposition which must be capable of resolution through synthesis?
If history is the realm of human action, then to predict future history, we must predict future human action. The "iron law" governing the development of human society must rest upon the necessary characteristics of such action. Although Marx offers us no explicit guidance, we may apply arguments which he puts to other purposes to show that he views human action in such a way that the required law may be established.
For Marx, human nature is itself the product of human society, and hence of the productive forces which underlie society. The clearest and fullest statement of his position is to be found in The Gerlllan Ideology:
Men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religion. or by anything one likes. They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to prodflce their means of subsistence, a step which is determined by their physical cousticution. In producing their means of subsistence men indirectly produce their actual material life.
The way in which men produce their means of subsistence depends in the first place on the nature of the existing means which they have to reproduce. This mode of production should not be regarded simply as the reproduction of the physical existence of individuals. It is already a definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite way of expressing their life, a definite »Jode of life. As individuals express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production. with what they produce and with how they produce it. What individuals are, therefore, depends on the material conditions of their production. 7 What man does determines what he is. Thus a mode oflife determines the characteristic nature of those who participate in it, through deter-mining the characteristic activities which constitute their participation. Marx argues that this is achieved through the social creation of human needs, that is, through the determination, by the social relations of production, of human motivation.
But, "as soon as it is satisfied, the first need itself, the action of satisfying and the instrument which has achieved this satisfaction, lead to new needs.'" Man acts, and thereby develops the forces of production, which in turn alter the relations of production so that new needs-new grounds of action-are created. Thus analysis of the historical process reveals the following stages: forces of production determine relatious of production, which produce human needs, which motivate human action, which establishes new forces of production-thus beginning the cyclic development anew. The opposition is resolved: man is the agent in history.
Granted that man always endeavours to act in a way such that the forces of production will be developed, need he succeed? Surely our argument, although it relates human activity to the historical process, must assume that man is an ideal agent, if the process is really to occur. Marx's iron laws, although they determine the ideal, the proper, even, one might say, the logical development of the forces of production, and hence of society, cannot be applied to the actual development of these forces, unless it can be shown, either that man achieves whatever he endeavours, or that man may fail to be an ideal agent without affecting the process. The first alternative is evidently false; what of the second?
Marx's account of the process whereby capital comes to be concentrated in fewer and fewer hands excellently exemplifies the compatibility of an unalterable development of society through human activity with the failure of much of that activity to achieve its end-exemplifies, indeed, the dependence of the development upon failure. The aim of competing capitalists is to maintain their rate of profit; the conditions under which they compete ensures that not all can do so. But, although this implies that particular capitalist enterprises must fail, and hence cannot develop their forces of production in accordance with the "iron law," it does not imply that all capitalist enterprises fail-rather, quite the opposite. The most effective competitors remain, and the capital formerly diffused in a much larger number of enterprises is concentrated in their hands. It is just this concentration, together with the improved techniques of production which are the basis of competitive success, which constitute the development-the necessary development-of the capitalist system. For Marx it is mankind, not each individual man, who must be the ideal agent, succeeding in his endeavours. If this may be assumed-and it is a large assumption to make today, when humanity itself seems capable of unintentional self-destruction-we may conclude that Marx's laws of social development may be interpreted to retain their necessity, yet to leave histoty as the sphere of human action. Thus we may answer those who claim that Marx's theory shows that socialist society will be achieved whatever men do, by saying that his theory shows what men will do to attain socialist society.'
III
Marx predicts that men will overthrow the capitalist order and establish socialism. But, through his prediction, men are made more fully aware of the effects of their actions. They understand the more far-reaching consequences of actions undertaken from simple self-interest. They may also understand their motives more clearly. But to be made aware of the consequences of one's proposed actions is normally to be put in a position to consider whether or not one shall modify one's intentions in the light of this new information. To be made aware of one's motives is normally to be put in a position to consider whether or not one shall continue to act upon them. As Stuart Hampshire argues in his recent book, Thought and Action : When Marx informs us of our ruture, we may agree that he has revealed to us what would have happened, had he not spoken, but consider, given our new knowledge, whether or not we shall act so that it will happen. If it proves impossible for us either to alter our actions, or to change the course of history by altering them, then the claim that we are truly agents in history, that the historical process is carried on through human action, must be either abandoned or severely modified.
The first alternative-that we are unable to act differently-makes us puppets rather than agents. We are not beings determining ourselves to action, but rather links in a causal chain. We are not agents in history.
The second alternative-that we are unable to change history by acting differently-makes history independent of man. We are not agents in history.
Neither of these alternatives can be accepted. The second, as we have seen, is explicitly rejected by Marx in The Holy Family. The first is incompatible with his insistence that man is truly an agent-an insistence implicit in those passages I have quoted from Th e German Ideology. But, if both alternatives fail, surely we must conclude that, in conferring knowledge upon us, Marx frees us as agents, and, in so doing, frees history from the bonds of his "iron law."
The opposition between prediction and action is now replaced by an opposition between theory and practice. The This opposition can be resolved only ifit is possible to show that Marxian theory is properly a theory of practice, that it explains the practical necessity of the laws it formulates. Certainly such a view of social theory will necessitate a departure from Marx's explicit statements more radical than that required to overcome the opposition between prediction and action. The iron laws of history will have to be made of a different kind of ironfor they will provide practical, rather than theoretical, bonds. But only such a reinterpretation will preserve the freedom of man as an agent, which to Marx is of the first importance. We must show, not only that the development of society occurs as the result of human action, but that, when man is brought to full consciousness of himself and his position, it is possible to vindicate this development, and especially those stages in it which man has yet to undertake. It is, therefore, necessary to take up the very arguments for socialist society which Marx wished to exclude-arguments showing its desirability-for these, far from being incompatible with "scientific socialism," can alone save the theory to which that name is improperly applied.
The first opposition was resolved through the historical determination of human nature by society. This second opposition requires resolution through the historical determination of society by man. Man must be, not merely the agent in history, accidentally creating an ever-changing society in the pursuit of his particular, ever-changing ends, but also the maker <fhistory, acting to realize a total purpose embodied in the entire fabric of society.
To say that man must create society, and that in this creation must be found the justification of the historical process which man, made selfconscious by Marxian theory, demands, is not to say that society is produced as an instrument, to serve human purposes. It is true that society exists for man, and not man for society, but the implications of this truth are not what they are for the individualist, liberal, or bourgeois social theorist. It will be worth our while to outline why Marx cannot use the classical liberal answer to the demand for a justification of society, as a justification of history.
The basic structure of liberal or individualist theories, such as those of Hobbes" and Locke, is quite simple. Man is portrayed as a being whose nature, needs, and interests are fixed, and fixed independently of, and prior to his entry into, society. Acting as a solitary individual, in the state of nature, man finds it impossible to satisfY his needs. Taking thought for how he may achieve true well-being, he discerns the necessity for an authority to control the actions of all men in certain respects, so that each man may better attain his ends, better use the independence left him to satisfy his original needs and fulfIl his interests. To create such an authority is to create civil society, which is therefore an instrument made by man in pursuit of pre-social, fixed concerns.
What bourgeois man achieves as a result of knowledge, Marxian man attains naturally. Society is not contrived in conscious opposition to the natural human environment; it is that environment. It is not the means whereby man can control his natural pattern of action in his own best interests, but the product of his natural pattern of action. It is not fix ed, but develops, and in developing, changes man, its maker.
It is the practical consequences of these differences which are important here. Bourgeois man, brought to awareness of his situation, is able to change it, to create an environment in which he can better attain wellbeing. Marxian man, brought to similar awareness, is unable to affect his situation except in detail. His "determination of society" is simply his recognition of the futility of intervention. The freedom which Marx confers upon man is the knowledge of practical necessity-the knowledge that what is to be done is what one is already doing.
Nor is this all. Marxian man recognizes that, in acting, in changing the forces of production available to him, he changes himself Even were he able to alter the cou rse of history without reducing order to chaos, the benefit he would hope to gain might not accrue to the new man which the new relations of production would create. Any criterion for the evaluation of actions affecting society can apply Dnly tD a particular society, embodying a particular set of productive relationships, creating a particular set of needs and wants in man. When the action negates the society from which it rises, its success or failure can be estimated only after its effect is produced.
Bourgeois society is, then, vindicated by certain features of its determination by bourgeois man which do not appear in the determination of Marxian society by Marxian man. The deliberate production of an environment in which man can attain satisfaction is impossible. But, although man's determination of his own nature rules out bourgeois standards of justification, may there not be a quite different standard inherent in this self-aeative process?
In his Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, Marx argues that freedom is attained through the development of the forces of production, so that, by their rational use, man is freed from the domination of his wants and needs. This freedom is never completeman cannot escape from nature-but it can be increased indefinitely. However, in freeing himself from nature, man enslaves himself to society. Man creates the forces of production whose development assures him dominance over nature, but these create the relations of production which determine the social relations of man. The productive system divides society into classes, each of which represents a separate stage of historical development, dialectically opposed to the preceding and succeeding stages.
Thus "the history of all hitherto existing society is the histDry of class struggles. "14 The dominant class exercises its power through control of the forces of production. It uses the instruments of freedom as instruments of slavery. But its control of these forces is superficial; although it attains mastery. it does not attain freedom. The members of the dominant class are tied to their role-albeit a privileged one-just as the members of other classes are tied to theirs. For in so far as social power is exercised through the forces of production. social freedom is alienated to these forces. Master and slave alike are dehumanized. alienated from their true selves. This alienation is greatest in the dominated classes. who do not own the objects they produce.
The more the worker expends himself in work, the more powerful becomes the world of objects which he creates in face of himself, and the poorer he himself becomes in his inner life, the less he belongs to himself . ... The worker puts his life into the object. and his life then belongs no longer to him but to the object . ... The life which he has given to the object sets itself against him as an alien and hostile force. 15 History is the second moment in the dialectical progression of man. Natural man. who stands at the hypothetical starting-point of the historical process. is the thesis. He is free from the domination of society. but at the price of total enslavement to his natural environment. In his actions he endeavours. not only to satisfY his needs. but to acquire permanently and securely the means of satisfYing them; that is. he endeavours to free himself from nature. In so doing. he develops the forces of production available to him. and thereby becomes historical man. the antithesis. Each advance historical man makes towards overcoming nature creates new needs. which motivate him to attempt further advances. and at the same time creates further productive forces. from which arise those relations which bind him more and more tightly in the service of his own creations.
Capitalist society is the culmination of this development. Man's conquest of nature makes possible freedom for all. yet society is so divided that the proletariat constitutes a class entirely alienated from itself. entirely bound by the relations of production. In this situation. the development of the forces of production brings the proletariat to power; all other classes disappear; man gains control of the social structure he has made. and thus is restored to himself Historical man passes over into social man. the dialectical synthesis. and true human existence begins. 
It is the solution of the riddle of history. and knows itself to be the solution. 1s
Marx contends that in history man makes himself truly human, by making himself a free being. The quest for freedom is the permanent substratum of the mutable particular wants and aims which determine a man's actions at any given time. But in what sense can one say that man seeks freedom? Granted that man will attain it, yet surely he does so as the by-product of the actual ends he does seek. Rather than underlying man's apparent mutability, freedom is superimposed upon it. If this is so, then, although the prospective emergence of the free man may suffice to induce us to accept our role in history, and to endeavour willingly to act in accordance with the principles of development inherent in our social system, yct this happy acceptance will be as fortuitous as the emergence of freedom itself. There will be no solution to the riddle of history, because there will be no riddle. Man's passage from the realm of nature through history to the realm of freedom will be a fact without further significance.
This objection overlooks Marx's insistence that the historical process represents, not only the actual development of mankind, but also the emergence of true human nature. Although the individual does not see his actions as instrumental in the creative process whereby man moves from a merely natural being, bound by the conditions which control all other creatures, to a free being controlling those conditions, yet his actions are nevertheless instrumental. And, although the creation of man as free is not directly intended by any individual-at least, not until the character of the historical process is revealed-yet human freedom does not result accidentally from actions intended to attain other goals, but rather results from the sum of actions intended to secure particnlar freedoms.
Such actions also enslave man-thus the dialectical character of history. But the attainment of freedom is the attainment of the sum of the historically conditioned goals which man sets for himself, so that we can say, in a very real sense, that freedom is the goal of humanity, without postulating humanity as a metaphysical super-entity.
Marx's social theory, regarded as a theory of practice, must rest on his conception of man. History is vindicated as the process whereby man attains true humanity, and this true humanity is freedom.
IV
Social theory is transformed into revolutionary practice. I must now show that philosophy is needed to provide the conception of man on which this transformation rests, and that, in providing it, philosophy transforms itself into social theory. And to do this, I shall turn, as I suggested at the beginning of this study, to the words of my analytic friends.
In the Tractat"s Logico-Philosophiws, Ludwig Wittgenstein, the Austrian eminence of modern British philosophy, laid down the dictum: "All philosophy is 'Critique oflanguage'."17 With this battle-cry, the analysts have swarmed forth. There has been, needless to say, considerable disagreement as to its interpretation (a not uncommon occurrence with batcle-cries); nevertheless, it defines a fairly well-recognized approach (or family of approaches) to philosophy, with which I assume the reader's familiarity.
The most austere practitioner of the linguistic school is the late John Austin. He, more than anyone else, has been accused of reducing philosophy to lexicography, of exclusive preoccupation with the supposedly trivial problems posed by words to the neglect of important philosophical problems concerning the world. It is, therefore, fortunate that I am able to employ here his views on philosophical method:
When we examine what we should say when, what words we should use in what situations. we are looking again not merely at words ... but also at the realities we use the words to talk about ; we are using a sharpened awareness of words to sharpen our perception of, tbough not as tbe final arbiter of, the pheno mena. ls Austin goes on to suggest that the phrase "linguistic phenomenology" might better describe the method he employs.
Thus philosophical analysis, although it is an analysis of words and phrases, of sentences and other forms of expression, is intended to illu-· minate the world about which, or in which, language is used. This illumination does not consist in the revelation of new facts. We are not introduced to a world beyond experience. Rather, we are provided with a clearer understanding of familiar areas of experience, of matters which, just because they can ordinarily be taken for granted, are apt to puzzle us when we reflect on them.
Austin devotes himself to the examination of particular words and families of words, thus endeavouring to increase our acquaintance with particular features of our experience, or particular forms of our activity.
But it is possible to extend the range of our study, to examine, not just families of words, but forms of expression, and eventually to consider the structure oflanguage as a whole. P. F. Strawson has termed this more far-reaching study "descriptive metaphysics."
Descriptive metaphysics attempts "to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world." It differs from philosophical analysis, not "in kind of intention, but only in scope and generality." It aims "to lay bare the most general features of our conceptual structure. "19 What can we learn from descriptive metaphysics? In revealing the structnre of our thought, it does not, as Austin has made clear, merely inform us about out thought, about our conceptual system. Just as the study of particular words focuses our attention on particular features of experience, so the study of our conceptual system as a whole draws our attention to the entire range of situations in which it is employed and to the corresponding range of human aims and purposes which govern its employment. Thus in reflecting on our thought about the world, we are considering both the world-the object of our thought-and man-the subject, the thinker.
Linguistic analysis, diligently pursued to its extreme limits, reveals to us something about man and the world. What is revealed need not be entirely true. Only in so far as the language which is the object of analysis is an adequate conceptual instrument, can we suppose that the conclusions of the analysis are sound. But there is no reason to suppose that an instrument refined by thousands of years of use is entirely inadequate, and hence no reason to consider that a study of our thought about the world should not at least illuminate the nature of man, of the world, and of the relation between them, even if it be not the final truth about them. In any case, only through analysis can that conceptual clarity be attained which is essential to successful systematic revision of our concepts, to provide a more adequate view of ourselves and of our world.
What is the nature of the view of man which analysis provides? It is not a scientific view, a view which would or could be propounded by a biologist or physiologist or psychologist. It should not be in conflict with their views, but it is obtained from a quite different standpoint. Their accounts of man are accounts of an object, viewed by an observer with, in each case, a differently limited range of interests. Analysis of the structure of our conceptual system, on the other hand, presents man as a subject, presents the account of man implicit in his own activity. It is man's view of himself. In understanding it, we clarify ourselves to ourselves; we clarify what it is to be human.
Not only does analysis provide us with a conception of man; this conception is essential to our understanding the structure of our thought. A view of man is not the by-product of successful linguistic analysis, thrown out as a sop to those who demand important truths from philosophers, but the key to the entire structure which the philosopher articulates. Stuart Hampshire argues this point: Philosophy provides a conception of man. But is it the conception which social theory requires? As I have admitted, biology, physiology, psychology also provide conceptions of man; why should not one of these be the basis of social theory? One might take as an example the Social Darwinists, who rest their argument on the biological theory of evolution.
To answer this question, it is necessary to examine once more the role of a conception of man in practical social theory. The vindication of history, and hence the justification of the course of human action alleged to be practically necessary in Marxian theory, rest upon the contention that through history man is brought to full humanity. If man is to judge history in terms of its contribution to his own self-realization, then he must judge it in terms of his view of himself It is not sufficient that he observe his fellows, trace the course of human development, and extrapolate to show that the socialist society is the natural culmination to history. For he might then ask himself whether he accepted this observed course of development, whether he intended to conform his actions to it. Rather, man must be aware of himself, not as object, but as subject, be aware of what it is to be human, and, in the light of this awareness, judge whether in socialist society he becomes more fully that which he is now, but is only in embryo. If Marx is right, man must see his present condition as one of self-alienation, and realize that he can acquire his true nature through, and only through, the Communist Revolution.
The practical validity of Marxian theory thus rests on a conception of man which must be a conception man has of himself. Marx presupposes, rather than proves, such a conception; in order to prove it, he would have to engage more fully than he does in philosophical argument.
But there is yet one further step necessary to show that the Marxian view actually transforms philosophy into social theory. So far, all that I have argued is that social theory requires a conception of man which only philosophy can provide, but this is not to say that philosophy in any sense becomes social theory. We must examine again Marx's view of man to establish this last point.
Marx views man as an agent. Man acts, and in acting brings under control the environment in which he acts. In controlling this environment, man frees himself, as an agent, from the restrictions it initially imposes upon him. Man becomes better able to determine his actions in accordance with his aims and interests; man becomes more fully an agent.
Marx views man as an agent, the basis of whose activity is determined by his social system. Thus, in coming to control that system, which is part of his environment, man comes to control the very grounds on which he acts. He gains the power to choose for himself his aims and interests, to choose these in such a way that his actions, based upon them, will prove fruitful and satisfYing, rather than frustrating. Man is delivered from the reign of uncontrolled passions, and becomes free to order his wants and needs into a coherent whole. Hence man becomes better able to determine his life in accordance with his over-all interests; man becomes more fully an agent.
Marx reveals man to himself as an agent. Man is brought to understand his powers and his situation, and is enabled consciously to direct his powers towards realizing his true self Through this awareness, man knows what he is and what he does, and thereby assumes that responsibility for himself which is essential to free activity. Able to control his environment and himself, aware of his environment and himself, man emerges from the realm of history into the realm of freedom.
Thus Marx's very conception of man, his account of him as a selfdetermining agent, displays the course of human development. To see what man is, is to see man engaged in the realization of his freedom. A man who understands himself knows what he must do. The philosophical conclusion has direct practical force; philosophy itself mounts the barricades to urge on the revolution. "What has to be accepted, the given, is-so one could say-forms of life."21 Thus Wittgenstein. Peter Winch develops from this the doctrine that it is the task of philosophy, and more particularly of epistemology, the central philosophical discipline, " to elucidate what is involved in the notion of a form of life as such," and argues that the recognition of this constitutes the genuine "revolution in philosophy" which the analytic movement has accomplished. 22 Do we then return to Hegel, to retrospective analysis? Philosophy, as Wittgenstein said, "leaves everything as it is."23 And this is so: philosophy does not impose itself on the world, does not come from above to tell the world how it ought to be. Rather, and this is the crux of the position I have endeavoured to develop: philosophy enables the lVorld to tell itseif how it ought to be. 8 Ibid., 60. 9 Marx ignores the deuiled arrangements whereby the capitalist system passes into socialist society because he does forget that man is the agent in history, that it is through the actions of human
